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Economists often espouse incentives, since 
they can lead to desirable outcomes simply by 
enlarging the set of voluntary choices available. 
Becker and Elias (2007), for instance, argue that 
allowing incentives for living organ donation 
would be a Pareto-improvement.1 Ethicists, by 
contrast, are typically queasy about incentives, in 
particular as they apply to transactions like organ 
donation, medical trial participation, or surrogate 
motherhood. Our aim is to better understand the 
empirical nature of the constraints that ethical 
concerns place on markets (Roth 2007; Ambuehl, 
Niederle, and Roth 2015; Ambuehl 2017).
In a recent working paper (Ambuehl, 
Ockenfels, and Stewart 2017), we show both 
theoretically and experimentally that when 
the acquisition and processing of information 
about a transaction is costly, individuals with 
higher marginal costs of information often 
respond more to a given increase in the incen-
tive. Hence, as incentives rise, people who find 
it more difficult to become well-informed about 
the transaction comprise an increasing fraction 
of participants. They elect to participate based 
on a less complete understanding of the con-
sequences of their choice (see Section IIC for 
intuition).
Incentives may thus be at odds with informed 
consent. This fundamental principle of bioethics 
1 Such incentives are currently prohibited in all countries 
except Iran. 
maintains that a decision is ethically sound if it 
is made not only voluntarily but also, in light of 
all relevant information, properly comprehended (DHEW 1978, The Belmont Report ).
Will people express reservations about 
incentives if they lead to the selection effects 
we document in our working paper? On the 
one hand, such behavior is consistent with 
Bayesian rationality. Hence, within a standard 
welfare economics framework, it does not give 
rise to concern. On the other hand, a mecha-
nism that causes people to participate based on 
an inferior understanding of the transaction is 
in uncomfortable company with the principle 
of informed consent, no matter whether ratio-
nal or not.
We examine this question using a vignette 
study. Respondents judge the ethics of incen-
tives for human egg donation when potential 
participants differ in cognitive ability, and of 
various policies to increase the supply of egg 
donors. We design the survey with two goals in 
mind. First, we separate concerns about incen-
tivizing people who differ in cognitive ability 
from concerns with incentivizing the poor. This 
distinction is relevant for a policymaker aiming 
for political feasibility. If, empirically, ethical 
concerns center around a lack of comprehension 
about the transaction, then the moral acceptance 
of an incentive system can be improved by inter-
ventions such as stringent informed consent 
requirements. By contrast, informational inter-
ventions will not ease concerns that primarily 
relate to economic inequality. Second, we aim 
to determine whether concerns about incen-
tives for people with heterogeneous ability are 
related to the mechanisms we document in our 
working paper. We test a necessary condition: 
How do respondents think incentives affect the 
selection of participants, and how do they think 
information acquisition responds depending on 
the ability of the incentivized? The theoretically 
predicted mechanisms are a plausible reason for 
concerns with incentives only if respondents 
anticipate them.
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I. Vignette
Our vignette briefly describes the transaction 
of paid egg donation and highlights the need 
for information acquisition that arises from its 
complexity. We introduce two women thinking 
about donating eggs in exchange for $8,000, and 
explicitly describe their cognitive ability and 
level of education, as well as their financial situ-
ation. For each respondent, the two women vary 
along one of the dimensions and are equal along 
the other, yielding the four treatments (ability 
varies, rich), (ability varies, poor), (high ability, 
finances vary), and (low ability, finances vary).2 
To mute the association between ability and 
income, respondents consider financial resources 
that vary due to an inheritance of $500,000, 
rather than due to differential wage rates.
We conducted the survey in Fall 2016 on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk with a total of 502 
US-based respondents. We paid $5 for participa-
tion, and attrition was independent of treatment (see the online Appendix for details and survey).
II. Results
A. Ethical Judgments
How do respondents ethically judge a rise 
in the incentive if it leads to a disproportion-
ate increase in the participation of low-ability 
women? We elicited respondents’ judgment of 
an increase in the incentive by $4,000, and asked 
them to assume that the additional donors drawn 
by the higher incentive are mostly low-ability 
women. A striking 59.2 percent of our respon-
dents think that the clinic should not raise the 
incentive, compared to 10.8 percent who think 
the opposite, and 30.0 percent who are indiffer-
ent, as panel A of Table 1 shows. In stark con-
trast, many fewer respondents disapprove of 
raising the incentive when asked to assume that 
it leads to negative selection regarding financial 
means. In this case, only 32.1 percent think the 
clinic should not raise the incentive, whereas 
21.0 percent think it should, and 46.8 percent are 
indifferent. Hence, respondents are concerned 
about incentivizing those who might not easily 
understand what they sign up for, and this is not 
2 We randomized the order of presentation and the assign-
ment of names to women on the individual level. 
merely an implication of concerns with incentiv-
izing the poor.
Both of these results are reflected in the 
answers to two additional questions. First, we 
separately elicited respondents’ judgments 
about who should be incentivized if a single 
additional donor is needed. On the one hand, 
28.4 percent think it is more ethically sound 
to incentivize the high-ability woman, 3.2 per-
cent would incentivize the low-ability woman, 
and the remaining 68.4 percent are indifferent, 
as panel B shows. On the other hand, respon-
dents feel less strongly, and less unanimously, 
about targeting women depending on financial 
resources. 86.1 percent are indifferent, and those 
who are not fall about equally on either side.
Second, we asked about the extent to which 
respondents consider an $8,000 incentive for egg 
donation ethical. As panel C shows, 15.6 per-
cent think that incentivizing  low-ability women 
is unethical, but only 4.8 percent think this way 
about incentivizing high-ability women, a dif-
ference of 10.8 percentage points ( p = 0.01 , 
averaged over financial resources). Varying 
financial resources by half a million dollars, by 
contrast, changes the fraction of respondents 
who consider the incentive unethical only by a 
statistically insignificant 2.4 percentage points (averaged over ability).3
B. Policy Judgments
How can one increase the number of partici-
pants in a transaction like egg donation in a way 
that respondents will view as ethically sound? 
Grant (2006, p. 33) suggests that persuasion “on 
the basis of reason alone might be considered 
the morally exemplary form of power.”
To test this intuition, we asked respondents 
to explicitly compare two policies, assuming 
that they both raise the expected number of par-
ticipants by the same amount, and generate an 
additional $4,000 in expenses per donor. The 
first policy simply increases the incentive pay-
ment. The second policy leaves the  incentive 
3 There is an interesting discrepancy between the large 
fraction of respondents who disapprove of a rise in the 
incentive, and the small fraction who consider the original 
incentive unethical. Many respondents seem to subscribe 
to the view that once somebody has declined an offer, one 
should not attempt to “bribe” them into changing their mind 
(Grant 2006). 
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payment unchanged, but uses the funds to pro-
vide information such as meetings with previous 
donors, and psychological counseling. Panel 
A of Table 2 shows that 67.7 percent of the 
respondents feel that the information policy is 
more ethical than the higher incentive. In stark 
contrast, only 10.4 percent predict that poten-
tial donors would prefer the information policy; 
78.9 percent predict donors would prefer the 
higher incentive.
These results suggest a demand for policies 
to ensure that participants in a transaction like 
egg donation are sufficiently well-informed. 
Hence, we asked respondents to assess two 
such interventions. The first requires potential 
egg donors to attend mandatory information 
sessions and to interview five previous donors. 
As panel B shows, 62.4 percent of respondents 
support this policy; only 24.3 percent oppose it. 
Support recedes only mildly (to 56.4 percent) 
for a more heavy-handed intervention that addi-
tionally requires potential donors to pass a thor-
ough exam about the possible consequences of 
egg donation. (Opposition rises to 28.3 percent.)
Respondents’ attitudes are consistent, on 
the individual level, with their predictions of 
 behavior. We elicited, for each woman and 
for each participation decision she could have 
made, how likely the respondent thought that her 
decision was in her own best interest, given the 
 information she had acquired. As the first col-
umn of panel C shows, the less likely a respon-
dent thinks a woman’s decision to participate 
is in her own best interest, the more likely they 
support mandatory information sessions, and the 
more likely they consider increasing participa-
tion through informational interventions ethi-
cally superior to higher incentives.4
The second column shows that whether a 
woman’s decision to abstain is deemed in her 
best interest has no predictive power; only 
judgments about the decision to participate 
do. Respondents’ policy judgments depend on 
4 This result refutes the alternative hypothesis that 
respondents’ reservations about incentivizing low-ability 
egg donors primarily concern the potential offspring. 
Table 1—Ethical Judgments
Do not Do Indifferent
Panel A. Raise incentive?
Selection: ability 59.2 10.8 30.0
(3.1) (2.0) (2.9)
Selection: income 32.1 21.0 46.8
(2.9) (2.6) (3.1)
Low High Indifferent
Panel B. Target whom?
Ability  3.2 28.4 68.4
(1.6) (1.6) (2.2)
Income  6.7  7.1 86.1
Low High Difference
Panel C. Incentivizing unethical?
Ability 15.6  4.8 −10.8
(1.9) (1.9) (2.7)
Income 10.7  8.3  −2.4
(1.8) (1.8) (2.6)
Notes: Panels A and B show the percentage of respondents 
selecting into each column. Panel C shows the percentage of 
respondents considering incentivizing the respective woman 
unethical. All panels only use the respondents for whom the 
respective attribute was varied and average over the other 
attribute. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2—Policy Judgments
Information Pay Neither
Panel A. Which policy?
More ethical 67.7 16.7 15.5
(2.1) (1.7) (1.6)
Donors prefer 10.4 78.9 10.8
(1.4) (1.8) (1.4)
Oppose Support Neither
Panel B. Law
Mandatory information 24.3 62.4 13.3
(1.9) (2.2) (1.5)
Exam 28.3 56.4 15.3
(2.0) (2.2) (1.6)
Choice in best interest
Participate Abstain
Panel C. Individual consistency
Support for
 Mandatory information −0.095 0.020
(0.049) (0.052)
 Mandatory information −0.081 0.040
  and exam (0.053) (0.056)
Information more ethical −0.100 −0.022
 than incentive (0.048) (0.050)
Notes: Panels A and B show the percentage of respondents 
selecting into each column, using those for whom the respec-
tive attribute was varied and averaging over the other attri-
bute. Panel C shows how participants’ responses depend on 
their beliefs about women’s choices. Jointly estimated using 
seemingly unrelated regression on all respondents. Standard 
errors in parentheses.
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beliefs about decisions that may cause a woman 
to be ex post worse off than before the transac-
tion, but not about those that may cause her to 
forgo a potential benefit.
C. Predictions of Behavior
To test whether moral concerns are plausi-
bly related to the selection effects described 
in Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart (2017), 
respondents predicted the behavioral effects of 
incentives. They did so before we elicited ethical 
judgments.
We presented the following scenario. A 
woman interested in donating eggs in exchange 
for $8,000 has informed herself by talking to 
a previous donor. That donor has encouraged 
participation. The woman considers searching 
for one more donor to interview, but she is not 
quite sure whether it is worth the effort. Now, she 
learns that the compensation for egg donors has 
increased to $12,000. How will this change the 
likelihood that she contacts an additional donor? 
And how will this effect differ if the previous 
donor had instead discouraged participation? For 
each of the women, each respondent saw both 
these questions.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results. 
Confirming the theoretical and experimental 
result in Ambuehl (2017), respondents predict 
that women who have talked to a discouraging 
donor will become more likely to contact another 
donor as the incentive rises. Indeed, if the oppor-
tunity cost of nonparticipation rises by $4,000, a 
Bayesian should exert more effort to ensure that 
the decision to abstain is not a mistake. At the 
same time, respondents predict women who have 
met an encouraging donor will become less eager 
to obtain a second opinion as the incentive rises. 
This is also consistent with rationality. The addi-
tional incentive provides partial insurance against 
ex post undesirable outcomes, causing a Bayesian 
to reduce the acquisition of costly information 
that may prevent ex post-mistaken participation.
Most crucially, respondents believe that 
incentives affect the information acquisition of 
low-ability women more strongly. Specifically, 
they predict that after receiving encouraging 
information, the higher incentive significantly 
deflates the propensity of low-ability women 
to contact another donor, but barely affects 
high-ability women. The effect of ability is 
significantly smaller if the initial information 
was discouraging.5 Such information acquisi-
tion behavior implies that low-ability women 
will respond more strongly to an increase in 
the incentive, and will therefore be selected 
disproportionately.
Indeed, respondents anticipate these selection 
effects. We asked whether women who would 
participate for $12,000 but not for $8,000 are 
more frequently high- or low-ability women. 
Panel B shows that a 64 percent-majority pre-
dict that the marginal participant would more 
frequently be a low-ability woman, whereas 
18.4 percent predict the opposite, and the 
remainder predict no selection effects.
5 Similarly, respondents predict that the information 
acquisition of women with lower financial resources reacts 
more strongly to an increase in the incentive. 
Table 3—Predicted Behavior
Low High
ability ability Difference
Panel A. ΔP (ask another donor)
First donor
 encouraging −0.55 −0.09 0.46
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
 discouraging 0.37 0.50 0.13
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Low High None
Panel B. Predicted selection
Ability 64.0 18.4 17.6
(3.0) (2.5) (2.4)
Income 75.8 19.0  5.2
(2.7) (2.5) (1.4)
 ∂ ability  ∂ incentive P(find second) 
after first donor was
encouraging discouraging
Panel C. Individual consistency
Selection effect of −0.129 0.048
 incentive on ability (0.053) (0.047)
Notes: Panel A jointly estimated using seemingly unrelated 
regression. Dependent variable coded as 1 = more likely, 
0 = just as likely, −1 = less likely. The difference-in-differ-
ences of 0.33 is statistically significant ( p < 0.01). Panel B 
shows the fraction of respondents selecting into each col-
umn. Panel C shows the individual-level relation between 
predicted effects on information acquisition and predicted 
selection effects. Panels B and C only use respondents for 
whom the respective attribute was varied and average over 
the other attribute. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Strikingly, respondents’ predictions about 
information acquisition relate to those about 
selection on the individual level. As panel C 
shows, respondents predict stronger selection 
effects if they have predicted a stronger effect of 
cognitive ability on the response of information 
acquisition to a higher incentive.6
Hence, moral concerns about incentives are 
plausibly related to the selection effects they 
exert, as documented in Ambuehl, Ockenfels, 
and Stewart (2017).
III. Conclusion
Informed consent requires adequate informa-
tion and comprehension. Our vignette study con-
siders a situation in which this requirement is in 
conflict with libertarian principles. It is motivated 
by the results in Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart (2017) who show that individuals with higher 
marginal costs of information processing often 
respond disproportionately to a rise in the incen-
tive, and decide to participate based on an inferior 
understanding of the consequences of their choice. 
Respondents to our survey have qualms about 
incentivizing people for whom information pro-
cessing is more difficult. These concerns directly 
relate to the ability to understand the transaction, 
and are not simply a side-effect of concerns with 
incentivizing the poor. Respondents express a 
pronounced preference for policies that increase 
adherence to the principle of informed consent, 
even if they restrict voluntary choice.
Respondents correctly predict how ability 
changes the effect of incentives on information 
search, and how incentives change the selection 
of participants. These predictions, and the indi-
vidual-level consistency between the two, show 
that moral concerns with incentives are plau-
sibly related to the mechanism documented in 
Ambuehl, Ockenfels, and Stewart (2017).
Designers of incentive systems for transac-
tions such as organ donation may benefit from 
taking these concerns into account. Our results 
suggest that policies will be considered  ethically 
sound only if they ensure that  participants 
6 For all of these variables, respondents indicated not only 
the sign but also the strength of the effect. 
have a thorough understanding of the possible 
 consequences of their choice. This is  particularly 
important in situations where  economic incen-
tives may lead to a higher fraction of partici-
pants for whom obtaining and appropriately 
comprehending information is more difficult. 
Potential applications include all transactions in 
which salient upsides are pitted against poten-
tially complex downsides that demand thorough 
but costly information acquisition. Examples 
include human research participation, paid organ 
donation, motherhood, and may extend to other 
domains such as personal finance decisions.
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